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ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POLITICAL ABUSES
IN PRE-DEMOCRATIC MALAWI: THE PRIMACY
OF TRUTH
A. Peter Mutharika*

I.

ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is a fundamental principle of good governance. To the
extent that legitimate government is based on the consent of its people,
consent can only be reasonably given when there is accountability. No
people would willingly consent to a government that can act with impunity.
Accountability implies responsibility, responsibility to the people
governed. Here, it implies responsibility of the Malawi government to its
citizens. This responsibility is two-fold: the government of Malawi is
retroactively responsible for past abuses and proactively responsible for the
prevention of future abuses.
The new government of Malawi may be held retroactively accountable,
even without its cooperation, based on theories of liability under customary
international law. These theories are well established I and will not be
belabored here. In the African context, these theories have been reinforced
by their incorporation in the African Charter on Human and People's Rights.
Interpreting the Charter in a case from Malawi, the African Commission on
Human and People's Rights has held that "a new government inherits the
previous government's international obligations, including the responsibility
for the previous government's mismanagement. . . . Although the present
government of Malawi did not commit the human rights abuses
2
complainedof, it is responsible for the reparation of these abuses."

Professor of Law, Washington University, St Louis, Missouri, U.S.A.

1 See, e.g., Arbitration Between Great Britain and Costa Rica, 18 AM.J.INT'L L. 147 (1924). See
also, CHRISTINE GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990), and Michael Garcia

Bochenek, Compensationfor Human Rights Abuses in Zimbabwe 26(2) COL. HUM. RTS. L REV. 483
(1995).

2 See COMMUNICATION 64/92 ET AL., AF COMM HPR, OPINION of 3 November 1994 / 28
June 1995 (emphasis added). This decision involved the unlawful political detention of Aleke
Banda and Orton and Vera Chirwa. Mr. Banda had been arrested and held without trial for over
twelve years, while the Chirwas were kidnapped from exile in Zambia and sentenced to death later commuted to life sentences. The Commission found numerous violations of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and expressed hope that with political changes, "a new
era of respect for the human rights of Malawi's citizens has begun."
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There are many reasons why a successor government may not want to
accept responsibility for the actions of a previous regime. The incentives to
avoid responsibility include the high cost of reparations, a reluctance to be
associated with the past, and a desire to move forward. However, the
success of a new government may depend on how it chooses to deal with the
excesses of a previous government. By fully and openly assuming
responsibility for past abuses, the new government reassures the people that
governments may not act with impunity, and thus gains the trust and
consent of its people.
It is not enough though for the new government to merely make
reparations; it must also develop institutions and policies that are designed
to prevent a repetition of past abuses. In the case of Malawi, the task is to
"balance retribution and a measure of forgiveness in order to achieve a
peaceful transition to multi-party democracy while promoting respect for the
3
rule of law and human rights, without which no democracy can thrive."

1I.

BRUTALIZATION

The need for accountability is most acute in cases where the previous
regime had engaged in widespread brutalization of its people. The Banda
regime was, without doubt, the most brutal civilian regime in Africa.
Malawi has been described as a "one-party state" during the period between
1966 and 1994. A more accurate description is that Malawi was a "one-man
state" with state, party, and civic institutions playing a subservient and
supporting role to Dr. Banda.4 It was thus common for political opponents
to be subjected to long periods of detention without charge and without trial.
For those political opponents who were charged, their convictions were
assured through a system of parallel traditional courts where the judges
[traditional chiefs] had no legal training, where there was no legal
representation, and where the rules of evidence did not apply.
Even more sinister than the existence of these subverted courts were the
acts of violence perpetrated by government security forces against political
opponents and unexplained disappearances of political opponents of the

3

See MAKAU MUTUA, CONFRONTING THE PAST: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

VIOLATIONS IN MALAWI, THE ROBERT F. KENNEDY MEMORIAL CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, May
1994, at 2.
4 See generally, AFRICA WATCH, WHERE SILENCE RULES: THE SUPPRESSION OF DISSENT IN
MALAWI (1990); THE SCOTrISH FACULTY OF ADVOCATES AND THE LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND
WALES, A REPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN MALAWI (1992); CONFRONTING THE PAST:
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN MALAWI, supra note 3.
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regime. Among the most notorious acts of brutality was the death of four
prominent politicians in 1983 [two of them cabinet ministers and the
secretary-general of the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the numbertwo position in Banda's one-man state] who, according to the regime, died in
a car accident at the Mwanza border town with Mozambique as they "fled"
Malawi. It has now been established beyond doubt that the four politicians
were brutally murdered by agents of the Banda regime. One lasting effect of
the Mwanza incident and the government's other brutal activities, and a
sinister contribution to the Malawi lexicon, is that in Banda's Malawi, a
political opponent could get "accidentalised"! The regime was also able to
exert control over the Malawi people by limiting freedom of expression and
confiscating property belonging to political opponents under the Forfeiture
Act if an opponent had, in the regime's opinion, acted in a manner
"prejudicial to the safety or economy of the state." A decision taken by the
regime under the Act could not be challenged in a court of law.
In order to ensure complete control of the country, the regime isolated
Malawi from the international and African regional community. No foreign
media were allowed entry into the country and Malawi journalists were
prohibited from communicating with outside journalists and news
organizations. Nongovernmental organizations were denied entry into
Malawi; ethnic, geographic, and religious divisions were encouraged; and a
large part of the economy was controlled by the regime and the ruling
political party through the Press Trust Corporation. The regime had
therefore succeeded in creating the equivalent of a national political and
economic concentration camp.

III. THE NEED FOR TRUTH
Any time a country experiences brutalization, there is a need for
reconciliation. 5 The discovery and dissemination of truth, about abuses,
victims, perpetrators, and government involvemen, has been identified as
essential to finding closure for the past and successfully approaching the
future. 6 Allowing open discussion of brutalization may begin the healing

5 Reconciliation is needed to engender trust in government and the rule of law, lessen

divisions among the people that were created by the previous regime, and enable the new
government to effectively function.
6

See CONFRONTING THE PAST: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN

MALAWI, supra note 3.
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process and aid in determining culpability. 7 Not only may discovery and
dissemination of truth be important in reconciliation, but also international
scholars and other groups have begun to describe access to truth as a right of
people.
ARTICLE 19, an NGO, has thoroughly articulated the basis for a right to
truth for victims of human rights abuses under international law. For human
rights victims, this right to truth has been identified as the essence of Article
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The text provides that the
right to freedom of opinion and expression includes the "freedom... to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas." There is support for recognition
of this right on a wider scale, evidenced by interpretations of other
international instruments and case law, and statements by international
8
organizations.
The right to truth is very simply conditioned on the need for
accountability as a fundamental principle of good governance. Truth is
knowledge, and armed with this knowledge, the people can demand
accountability. The Indonesian Truth and Justice Commission has stated,
"reconciliation without exposing truth and justice could be considered an act
of deceiving the victims." 9 The Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for
Human Rights recommended, in a report on Malawi, that the "process of
transition must fully uncover the scope of past abuses and make such
information public. Without such a step, it is impossible to learn from the
mistakes of the past and create institutions, norms and processes that will
ensure that repression is not repeated." 1 0

7 See ARTICLE 19, "WHO WANrs TO FORGET?" TRUTH AND AccESS TO INFORMATION
ABOUT PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. An actual truth commission is not necessary in order

to discover the truth; information can be collected through media investigations, civil society
initiatives, and even criminal prosecutions. The organization advocates access to almost all
information - particularly that related to issues of human rights - as the touchstone of
democracy. The "right to truth" about past human rights violations is viewed as a subset of the
broader right to freedom of information. There are no time limits for this rights, thus, a
government must cooperate in the uncovering of past abuses as well as provide information
about its current activities.
8 Id.
9 See The Painfid Path to Justice, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, January 2000, at 14.
10 See CONFRONTING THE PAST: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
MALAWI, supranote 3, at 39.
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IV.

ACCOUNTABILrrY IN MALAWI

A. Truth
In Malawi, there has been an undeniable resistance to discovery and
dissemination of the truth on the part of Western donors and the new
government. Western donors claim that there is no need to uncover the past,
that doing so would serve no purpose. Even if it does not aid in closure, and
even if none of the perpetrators are brought to justice, the truth is still
important for the simple fact that history repeats itself. It is therefore
important for the Malawi people to know what happened and for the
government to operate under the threat of exposure.
An obvious
explanation of the donors' resistance to truth discovery is that they
supported the Banda regime even in the face of uncontroverted evidence that
the regime was engaged in large scale brutalization of the Malawi people. 1 1
The current government is in certain respects a continuation of the old
government both in style and attitude. It has therefore not supported calls
for the creation of a truth commission. Many current politicians, both in and
out of the government, served in the Banda regime and some of them quite
possibly participated in, or at least condoned, some of the excesses of the
Banda regime. Without pressure from western donors and civil society to
establish a truth commission, these individuals will never support the
establishment of a truth commission. Other than the limited Mwanza
Commission of Inquiry mentioned elsewhere in this article, no effort to
establish a truth commission has been made.
1.

Commission of Inquiry

While there have been no wide-reaching truth commissions, the Mwanza
incident had enough political and social significance to eventually prompt
government action.1 2 A Commission of Inquiry was formed, but its mandate
was limited to the narrow issues surrounding the Mwanza incident.
However, the passage of over a decade without any investigation had taken
its toll; several of the potentially key witnesses were dead. The commission
made a finding that Banda and his assistant John Tembo had ordered the

11 See "WHO WANTS TO FORGET?" supra note 7. "Foreign donors effectively exercised a
veto over the government budget and could have exercised strong pressure in favour of an
investigation if they had chosen to. But they had not."
12

See CONFRONTING THE PAST: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN

MALAWI, supra note 3, at 14-15.
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murders, but they were later found innocent in a court of law. Arguably the
prosecution would have increased its chances of success had there been a
fuller truth inquiry to explore all avenues and which may have uncovered
convincing evidence of guilt.
In fact, the Commission of Inquiry only served to undermine truth
discovery in Malawi. By deliberately limiting its investigation to a small
group of people and a single incident, the government signaled its intent to
avoid meaningful discovery of the truth.
2.

Malawi History Project

The Malawi History Project was an attempt by scholars and historians to
record the history of the Banda regime. Restrictions on freedom of
expression, and the severe consequences of challenging the Banda regime
had prohibited the recording of many events during the regime particularly of acts of brutalization. In the aftermath of the Banda regime,
the University of Malawi formed a nine-person committee to begin
accumulating information, conducting interviews and developing a strategy
of investigation. 1 3 Unfortunately, this effort elicited the same response as
calls for the creation of a truth commission did - that there is no need to
dwell on the past - so the Project was unable to obtain adequate funding.
Even if the History Project had received adequate funding, it would not
have been an appropriate alternative to a government-initiated truth inquiry
for several reasons. First, the non-governmental nature of the Project raises
issues of credibility. The committee members were from the private sector,
with unclear political affiliation or motivation. 1 4 Further, a process that does
not involve the government would not be accompanied by any admissions of
governmental responsibility. Additionally, the Project would have limited
value because of its inability to compel testimony. The Project would have
no power to subpoena witnesses or conduct inquiries under oath. Thus,
while the efforts of those who attempted to launch the Malawi History
Project were admirable - and certainly preferable to no investigation of
abuses at all - the Project would be still have been a second-best substitute
for governmental investigation and official publication of findings.

13 See Probing Into Human Rights Atrocities, MALAWI NEWS ONLINE 30 November 1996
(http:/www.sydrafrica.dk).

14 The efforts of these professionals might be better utilized in a project similar to one
recently established in South Africa - rewriting history textbooks to reflect the truth. See Daisy
Jones, New History Textbooks Proposed. BUSINEss DAY, 15 December 2000 (www.allafrica.com).
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B. Reparations
The Malawi government has chosen to make very few reparations.
There has been some symbolic compensation - for example, the Mikuyu
Detention Camp was opened as a museum 1 5 - but no truth commissions
have been established and very few perpetrators have been subjected to
criminal or civil liability. The government has made the greatest effort in the
area of actual compensation, but with dubious commitment and success.
Malawi citizens have two possible avenues of actual compensation: the
National Compensation Tribunal and Malawi civil courts.
1.

National Compensation Tribunal [NCTJ

The NCT was established under the constitution to "redress the excesses
of the Banda dictatorship." 1 6 Its mandate is limited to ten years from its
creation, and it has exclusive jurisdiction over any civil and criminal claims
against the previous government. Awards are paid out from the National
Compensation Fund, a practice that has drawn criticism because Malawi
taxpayers bear the burden of supporting the Fund. 1 7 This process has been
18
described as a form of "amnesty for past abusers."
The NCT has been criticized for its management of the Fund because
while some prominent members of the new government have received large
payments, many ordinary claimants have received small interim payments,
and the government has in some cases attempted to influence decisions of
the tribunal. Further, the information revealed through the claims is not
publicly disseminated.
The NCT is currently processing more than 7,000 claims, including one
by a former minister of the Banda regime, who is now the leader of MCP, for
$357,000 in compensation for property confiscated by the MCP at the time of
his arrest.1 9

15

Less than 2,000 of the claimants have been given interim

See Steven Nhiane,. Malawi: Soothing the Pain of 30 Years' Oppression, ANB-BIA

SUPPLEMENT, Issue 354.15 October 1998.
16 See PETER MUTHARIKA, LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: MALAWI, forthcoming.

17 See Peter Mutharika. The Democratic Constitution of Malawi, 1996 J.A.L. 219.
18

See CONFRONTING THE PAST: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN

MALAWI, supra note 3.
19
See Opposition Leader Wants $357,000 Government Compensation for Lost Property,
PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCy. 27 September 2000. Gwanda Chakuamba was arrested for
attempting to assassinate Banda.
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payments, and only US $800,000 had been disbursed between 1996 and 1998.
Interim payments are made to former detainees on the following schedule:
$200 for people detained up to three months, $400 for those detained
between three and six months, and $600 to those detained between six
20
months and one year.
2.

Malawi Civil Courts

Under a constitutional amendment, Malawi citizens were given the right
to pursue compensation from any private person acting in a governmental
capacity during the previous regime, in the regular civil courts. However,
the real "purpose of the amendment is to rid the present government of
responsibility for compensating people who were victimized under the
Banda regime." 2 1 One problem with pursuing compensation through the
civil courts is the evidentiary standard used as with the Mwanza incident,
evidence can be very difficult to collect because of the passage of time.
Witnesses may have died or been forced into exile, and important documents
may have been destroyed. Claimants may lack the resources necessary to
accumulate evidence. In addition, although a claimant may be able to
generally prove that the government was responsible for committing abuses,
it can be almost impossible to assign responsibility to a specific person acting
in a governmental capacity.
C. Reconstruction
Reconstruction involves establishment of new institutions and policies,
and ending previously divisive practices. It is necessary to prevent further
or future brutalization.
1.

Constitution

Malawi's constitution, which was officially enacted in 1995 and amended
in 1998, is the most visible and far-reaching effort toward reconstruction.
Although plagued by several drafting problems, it is extremely detailed and
addresses many of the sources of previous abuses. 2 2 It has been the vehicle
for much of the change that has occurred in the past few years. The
Constitution has established several different institutions designed to create

20

See Steven Nhlane, Malawi: Soothing the Pain of 30 Years' Oppression, ANB-BIA

SUPPLEMENT, Issue 354.15 October 1998.

21 See Peter Mutharika, The Democratic Constitution of Malawi.supranote 17.

22 See PETER MUrHARKA,

LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: MALAWI,

supra note 16.
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both retroactive and proactive accountability. They include: the National
Compensation Tribunal, the Office of the Ombudsman, a Human Rights
Commission, an independent Electoral Commission, and the AntiCorruption Bureau.
2.

Human Rights Commission

Under the constitution, the Human Rights Commission is "charged with
the responsibility of investigating cases where violations of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or any other law are alleged." 2 3 This is a
very broad responsibility and the HRC is constrained by time and budget
with its current cases, effectively preventing inquiry into violations of the
previous regime. Nonetheless, it has been recommended that the Human
Rights Commission should take the form of a truth commission and publish
its findings. 24 The general feeling among human rights activists in Africa is
that African Human Rights Commissions, generally established in response
to demands by western donors, have had negligible impact on the promotion
25
of human rights in Africa.
3.

Ombudsman

The Office of the Ombudsman, established under the constitution, has a
very broad mandate: to investigate all cases in which an individual has
suffered an injustice. Where the Ombudsman concludes that an injustice has
taken place, he or she may take administrative action to ensure that the
injustice is redressed. If it is concluded that prosecution is warranted, the
Ombudsman shall make such a recommendation to the Director of Public
Prosecutions and has the right to demand reasons for the Director of Public
26
Prosecution's refusal to prosecute.
The Ombudsman has broad-reaching powers and has become a lawyer
of sorts for the unrepresented. The office has received thousands of
complaints in its five years of existence. Although the office has suffered
somewhat from budgetary limitations and political constraints, it has
performed well and earned the respect of various segments of Malawi

23 See Peter Mutharika, The DemocraticConstitution of Malawi, supra note 17.
24

See MAKAU MUTUA, CONFRONTING THE PAST: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

VIOLATIONS IN MALAWI, supra note 3.

25 See Human Rights Commissions Often Silent, Have Little Effect, PAN AFRICAN NEWS
AGENCY 26 February 2001.
26 See Peter Mutharika, The Democratic Constitution ofMalawi, supra note 17.
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society. The fact that the current holder of the office was named the 2000
27
Man of the Year is illustrative of the respect the office enjoys.
4.

Anti-Corruption Bureau

The Anti-Corruption Bureau was established to "investigate suspected
cases of corruption by public officials and to refer cases where it appears that
corruption has taken place to the Director of Public Prosecutions for possible
prosecution." 28 The Bureau forms an integral part of the World Bank's anticorruption program in Malawi. 2 9 As part of the program, the Bureau is
required to conduct awareness campaigns about the rule of law.
The Bureau's activities, or lack thereof, continue to draw attention.
Speaking on behalf of the donors, the British High Commission to Malawi,
for example, has recently condemned Malawi for its ineffective anticorruption stance. The Bureau has responded by claiming that the anti3 0 Out of
corruption laws are vague and prevent successful prosecutions.
the three thousand cases pending, the Bureau has lost in the courts almost all
of the twenty cases it has completed. 3 1 Transparency International, an anticorruption organization, has also criticized the Anti-Corruption Bureau for
its failure to publicly report findings - a step which it views as crucial in
preventing future corruption. 3 2 Another source of weakness for the Bureau
is its lack of political autonomy; the Bureau does not have independent
prosecutorial powers, and the President has the power to dismiss the Bureau
Director at any time. Recently, there have been allegations of massive
corruption at the highest levels of the government and several cabinet
ministers have been dismissed. Corruption has therefore become a political
rather than a law enforcement problem. In such a context, it is questionable
whether the Anti-Corruption Bureau can succeed in its mission.

27 See Frank Nkondetseni, Malawi Going to the Ombudsman ANB-BIA SUPPLEMENT, Issue
392 15 June 2000.
28 See PETER MuTHARIKA, LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: MALAWI, supra note 16.
29

See Malawi's National Anti-Corruption, STRATEGY INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION

CONFERENCE (http://www.transparency.de)
30

See Donors Unimpressed By Malawi's Anti-corruption Gimmicks, PANAFRICAN NEWS

AGENCY 19 February 2001 (http://www.allafrica.com).

31 See Britain Pressures Malawi to Prosecute Corrupt Civil Servants, AFRICAN EYE NEWS
SERVICE 20 February 2001 (http://www.allafrica.com).
32 See Corruption Watchdog Slams Malawi for Lack of Transparency, AFRICAN EYE NEWS
SERVICE 28 November 2000 (http://www.allafrica.com).
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Other Efforts

In addition to creating institutions that promote accountability, the
government of Malawi must repeal laws and change government practices
that undermine democratization as part of reconstruction. The government
has already repealed the Forfeiture Act, the Decency in Dress Act, and the
Preservation of Public Security Act, three of the laws most used to brutalize
the people of Malawi. There has also been an amendment to the penal code
that makes it harder to imprison people for acts of sedition, and small
measures toward developing a policy of non-discrimination. 3 3
The
government has removed the ban on Jehovah's Witnesses and is reevaluating oppressive policies against Malawi citizens of Asian origin.
D. Current Processesof Change
Reconstruction is a continual process; there are still many changes that
need to be made in Malawi in order to prevent a repetition of the past. There
needs to be further reform with regard to the civil service, the internal
democracy of political parties, internal security, regional and international
integration, and governmental policies concerning exiled peoples or
refugees.
1.

Civil Service

The Malawi Civil Service is still suffering from the unprofessional,
hierarchical structure that existed during the Banda regime. Civil servants
are "immensely overworked and under-compensated at all levels of
government service," a situation that makes corruption far more likely. 3 4
2.

Political Parties

In the past, the Malawi Congress Party [MCP] was undeniably an
instrument of repression for the government. In the new multi-party system,
many of the same politicians from the MCP are leaders of the new parties,
limiting the apparent choices the new system offers. These members have
not completely changed their former ways. For example, during the 1999
election the Malawi Broadcast Company [MBC], the state-owned radio, only
covered presidential events, but the ruling party would take advantage of

33 See TREVOR CULLEN, MALAWI: A TURNING POINT 93-94 (1994).
34

See JAMES TOLEDANO MALAWI ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM. 2 July 1998.

The system has impeded technology transfers.
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this practice and include campaign speeches at the events. The High Court
of Malawi ruled that principles of the Constitution regarding equal treatment
of political parties should not be subverted through MBC. 3 5 More than the
"proliferation of uncensored newspapers" is needed to balance coverage of
the political parties and provide real choices for the people. 3 6 Furthermore,
the general concern in the country is that some of the members of the old
political order, who now profess to be commited to the democratization
process, may not be positive forces in the truth discovery process.
The political parties also suffer from a lack of internal democracy. Most
political parties in Malawi have not held party conventions, as provided for
in their constitutions, and sometimes candidates have been appointed to
positions to which they should have been elected. If there is no democracy
within parties, there cannot be democracy within the country.
Internal Security

3.

The police system was the primary instrument used by the previous
Banda regime to brutalize the people; the military remained remarkably
uninvolved. Thus, there is a strong need to regain the trust necessary for the
police to perform its intended function as a protector of the people. This will
take serious measures designed to create accountability and improve the
people's expectations for internal security.
The new Constitution anticipates this need. It contains provisions
forbidding political affiliation or utilization of the police force. It
depoliticizes the office of the Inspector General and establishes a Police
Service Commission to exercise disciplinary control over the force. Previous
excesses of the Inspector General have now been constrained through
oversight by the National Assembly. Internal security would benefit most
from practical improvements. There is a strong need for modernization,
which should include communications technology, advanced training, and
instituting community-based policing programs.

35

See Malawi Court Orders Fair Election Coverage (http://www.fxi.org.za/Medialaw/

fairelect.htm). MBC was ordered to provide equal coverage of campaign speeches of the
different political parties.
36 See TREVOR CULLEN, supra note 33, at 98. Many of these newspapers are described as
tabloids.
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Exiled Peoples or Refugees

Thousands of Malawians were either forcibly expelled from their
country or left because they feared for their safety. These people include
some of the most severe victims of brutalization, and for accountability to be
genuine, it is important to include returning people in these efforts.
However, there are no provisions for their reparation, evidenced by their
ineligibility for compensation from the NCT. 3 7 They have also not been
included in reconstruction policies.
Most notably, Malawi citizens who reside outside Malawi, have been
denied the right to vote. Under the new Constitution, there are no
provisions for absentee balloting; in order to vote, a voter must register as a
voter in his or her constituency. Ironically, non-citizens who have been
residents for more than seven years have been given the right to vote. The
1966 Citizenship Act also continues to circumscribe the activities of Malawi
citizens. The Act penalizes those who attempt to obtain a foreign citizenship,
by forcing them to renounce their Malawian citizenship. While Malawi
citizens often have legitimate business reasons for obtaining a second
citizenship, the Banda regime operated on the assumption that there were
always political motives for seeking foreign naturalization. Reconstruction
requires the repeal of both the franchise provision in the Constitution and the
1966 Citizenship Act.
Approaches to Accountability
Each of the countries experiencing situations similar to Malawi
[reconstruction periods after brutalization] have approached the process of
reconciliation differently, with different approaches to the issue of
accountability. Some countries have chosen to only pursue reparations,
while others have chosen limited reparations and instead focused on
reconstruction. Reconciliation is highly contextual, and depends on the
priorities that the new government chooses.
a)

Reparations

There are several different forms of reparations that governments may
make. They include: discovery and dissemination of truth, punishment of
perpetrators, symbolic compensation, and actual compensation. Although
each form has expected benefits, many concerns or problems arise whenever

37 See "WHO WANTSTO FORGE?", supra note 7.
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a new government decides to make reparations for the abuses perpetrated by
38
the old government.
i. Truth Commissions
A "truth commission" may be established by the government in order to
share information about past abuses in a public forum. The truth
commission approach is intended to provide closure and healing, both on an
individual and national level. Further, the information discovered by a truth
commission may aid in identifying perpetrators for later prosecution.
There is some risk in establishing truth commissions, as they might cause
political instability or even thwart reconciliation efforts, particularly when
the new government is comprised of many of the perpetrators of the old
government. Truth commissions may also have limited utility in situations
where truth is virtually unascertainable - for example, all witnesses are dead
and the perpetrators are unwilling to come forward.
In Guatemala, a truth commission was convened, and the commission
found conclusively that the military was guilty of specific acts of
brutalization, but many of the names of perpetrators were not publicly
disseminated. 3 9 Subsequent efforts by the civil society to identify
perpetrators were often met with violence. In contrast, the Truth and Justice
Commission in Indonesia has used its findings as a catalyst for legal
40
action.
ii. Punishment of Perpetrators
Some countries may decide to institute criminal proceedings or grant
victims the right to pursue civil claims against perpetrators as opposed to
establishing truth commissions. Criminal and civil liability of perpetrators
may provide a sense of "real" justice for the victims, deter future
governments from behaving similarly, and restore faith in a government that
people know is accountable for its actions.

38 These concerns are particularly applicable in the case of Malawi. See COMMUNICATION
64/92 ET AL., AF COMM HPR, OPINION OF 3 NOVEMBER 1994 / 28 JUNE 1995. "Although the
present government of Malawi did not commit the human rights abuses complained of, it is

responsible for the reparations of these abuses."
39 See Matt Moffet, Suits of Armor: GuatemalansBegin to Seek War Redress by Marching to
Court, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 18 July 2000, at A12.
40 See The Painful Path to Justice, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, January 2000,

at 14.
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Such punishment is not always feasible, as prosecution may be nearly
impossible due to lack of witnesses or evidence, guilt may be too widespread
to focus on a single perpetrator, the
new government may have made amnesty agreements with the previous
regime, or members of the new government may be perpetrators themselves.
In Guatemala, the army has only limited amnesty - in contrast with the
41
widespread amnesty other militaries in Latin America received.
b)

Symbolic Compensation

A government may make certain concessions or gestures with the intent
to acknowledge the brutalization, without actual monetary or restorative
compensation. This type of reparation may take the form of reburials,
memorial services, small monetary offerings, or establishing museums.
Symbolic compensation often serves the purpose of "national" healing at a
much lower cost than actual compensation, important for new governments
with limited resources.
However, symbolic compensation is not always effective. Victims may
desperately need actual compensation, such as medical treatment or
payment of lost wages. Also, victims may cynically view the gesture as a
superficial effort toward reconciliation. Symbolic compensation has been
most utilized by countries dealing with the aftermath of World War II and
the Holocaust in which actual compensation also played no small part.
c)

Actual Compensation

A government may attempt to actually compensate victims
brutalization, usually monetarily, with the intent of returning the victim
his virtual position before the abusive act occurred. The obvious benefit
this is that the victim may feel completely compensated and thus be ready
move forward.

of
to
of
to

There are numerous drawbacks to actual compensation. Sometimes it is
impossible to compensate a victim, that is, in cases of death or destruction of
irreplaceable property.
This may lead to the conclusion that all
compensation is really symbolic. In addition, monetary figures seem
arbitrary. What is fair for 10 years of false imprisonment? Should it be
double for 20 years? There may be inequality in access to compensation, for
example, people in visible positions are often thought to receive more

41 See Matt Moffett, Suites of Armor, supra note 39.
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compensation, more quickly. In Zimbabwe, there are indications that the
government favors military officers and high-ranking officials when making
financial reparations. 4 2 Victims may not be prepared to hadle a large sum
of unexpected money, particularly if they have not had means in the past.
One of the most disturbing aspects of actual compensation is that the victims
may technically bear the monetary burden, as in the case of Malawi, where
taxpayers support the National Compensation Tribunal. Additionally, large
monetary settlements can place constraints on the budget of a struggling
new government.
V.

CONCLUSION

Accountability may be accomplished by any combination of reparations
and reconstruction efforts, but real and lasting accountability can only be
achieved through the revelation of meaningful truth. There are no absolutes
in the process of reconciliation; reparations are only temporary and
reconstruction efforts cannot perfectly guarantee prevention of future abuse.
However, the truth is an absolute, and it is the only way to achieve real
accountability. Future governments will shape their behavior based on the
likelihood that their actions will be exposed, and the people will measure
their respect for the rule of law and authority of the government by the
protection that truth can provide for them.
The right to truth has been established under international law and
should be claimed by the people of Malawi. There is an insatiable curiosity
on the part of Malawi citizens to finally know what happened during the
three decades of the Banda regime and to have the information exposed to
the world. To that end, the Malawi History Project should be revived and
donors should support it - without arbitrary conditions on funding. Civil
society can also make important contributions to discovering the truth by
conducting studies, interviewing citizens, and publishing reports. But in the
end, what is needed most is an official inquiry, whether in the form of a
"truth commission" .or otherwise, in order to achieve accountability in
Malawi. There is a need for truth, and for the sake of accountability, a need
for the government to recognize the people's right to truth.

42 See "WHO WANTS TO FORGET?" supra note 7.

